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~SSERRORINTHEPENALTYPHASE

OF A CAPITAL CASE: A DOCTRINE
MISUNDERSTOOD AND MISAPPLIED
Linda E. Carter•
The trial of the capital case is over. The defendant was convicted
of murder. In the penalty phase, the State proved the aggravating
circumstance of a murder in the course of a robbery. The defense
introduced mitigating evidence of the defendant's financial stress
and devotion to his family. The defense was precluded, however,
from presenting evidence of the defendant's good adjustment to life
in prison. The jury concluded that aggravating circumstances
outweighed mitigating circumstances and the defendant was
sentenced to death. On appeal, the court finds that it was constitutional error to refuse to admit the defense's evidence of the good
adjustment to prison.1 Should the death verdict be reversed, or
was the unconstitutional failure to admit mitigating evidence
merely harmless error? This Article addresses the issues that arise
in transferring the harmless error doctrine, developed in the
context of a typical criminal trial, to the unique decision in the
penalty phase of a capital case.
In the current climate of concern that capital cases are litigated
for too many years, 2 the harmless error doctrine is increasingly

• ProfeBSOr of Law, McGeorge School of Law. B.A. 1974, University of Illinois; J .D. 1978,
University of Utah. The author wishes to thank those who commented on this article,
especially ProfeBSOrs Scott W. Howe, Barry Stem, John Sims, and Clark Kelso, and her
research assistants, Jineen Cuddy and J im Cordes.
1
See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986) (holding that precluding defendant
from presenting evidence of •good adjustment~ to life in jail was reversible error). Unless
an error is considered reversible per se, the "harm• of an error is dependent on the facts of
each individual case. Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 51-89 (discussing
relationship between harm and obtaining the correct result in a case).
2
See, e.g., Daniel E. Lungren & Mark L. Krotoaki, Public Policy uuoM from the Robert
Alton Harris Ctue, 40 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 295 (diBCUBsing the California case of Robert Alton
Harris, who was convicted in 1978 and executed in 1992). The delay in the Harris case
generated considerable criticism. Id . at 298. The Attorney General of California referred
to appellate and habeas proceedings as -Jegal maneuverings. • I d. But see Charles M. Sevilla
& Michael Laurence, Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents: The Death Penalty
Ctue of Robert Alton Harris, 40 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 345 (1992). The authors, who represented
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applied to speed the process to a conclusion. In the haste to apply
the doctrine in the penalty phase of a capital case, the rationale for
the doctrine is being ignored. The use of a harmless error analysis
is premised on an ability to determine the effect of the error on the
decision rendered. 3 The effect of an error on the penalty phase
decision, which usually requires a weighing of aggravating and
mitigating factors, 4 is significantly more difficult to assess than is
the effect of an error on the decision that a particular element of a
crime exists.
The application of the harmless error doctrine to the penalty
phase of capital cases is probably a natural extension of the trend
by the courts to subject an increasing number of errors to a
harmless error analysis.5 By viewing the application of the
harmless error doctrine in the penalty phase as completely
analogous to harmless error in the guilt phase, however, courts
have failed to analyze adequately the rationale of the doctrine.
This Article addresses the applicability of the harmless error
doctrine to constitutional errors raised on direct review in the
penalty phase of capital cases. 6 The first section sets forth the
history of applying the harmless error doctrine to constitutional
error, as developed by the United States Supreme Court. The

Harris on death row, explain the reasons for the court proceedings and note that substantive
challenges, such as the lac:lt of mitigating medical testimony at the original trial, were
legitimately raised through habeas proc:eedings. ld.
1
Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1264 (1991); see also infra text accompanying
notes 29-37 (di8CUIIsing recent Supreme Court decisions on the harmleu error doctrine).
• See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (Deering 1985) (stating that trier of fact must decide
if "aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances•); .e also statutes cited
infra note 100.
'See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizons v. Fulminante: TM Harm ofApplying Hannku
Error to Coeroed Confeuioru~, 105 HARV. L. REv. 152, 159 (1991) ("Since Chapman, the
Supreme Court has expanded the power of courts to find harmless constitutional error. •);
Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Ho.rmku Coru~titutional Error, 88 COL. L. REv. 79,
79-80 (1988) (referring to "the [Supreme Court's] increasingly widespread use of the doctrine
of harmlellB constitutional error-).
1
The Supreme Court bas recently held that a Ieeser harmless error standard will apply
to constitutional error raised in federal habeas proceedings. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S.
Ct. 1710, 1718 (1993). For a diiiCUIIBion of this case, see infra notee27-28 and accompanying
text. This article spec:ific:ally addressee the standard developed through cases on direct
review. However, the basic: concern of this Artic:le, that the value-baaed decision in the
penalty phase must be considered in deciding harmleu error iuues, is applicable to either
standard.
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second section discusses two ml\ior interpretational issues that
plague harmless error analysis: (1) the meaning of the terminology
that an error does not "contribute" to a verdict; and (2) when an
error should be treated as per se reversible rather than subject to
harmless error analysis.
The third section focuses on the applicability of the harmless
error analysis to the penalty phase. This section is subdivided into
three parts. The first subsection identifies the critical characteristics of the penalty phase proceeding. The second subsection
questions the applicability of the harmless error doctrine to error
in the penalty phase. Particular attention is given to the nature of
the penalty decision and the rationale of the doctrine. The third
subsection critiques the method of assessing the harm in the
penalty phase.
Ultimately, the Article suggests that the value of the harmless
error doctrine to the criminal justice system will be preserved if
courts recognize that the value-based decision in the penalty phase
stands in stark contrast to the fact-based decision in the "guilt
phase" or trial. The difference in the nature of the decision
rendered in the penalty phase merits consideration by the courts in
assessing both the applicability of the doctrine and, if applicable,
the harm of an error.
I. THE DEVEWPMENT OF THE HARMLESS ERROR STANDARD

Harmless error as a concept originated as a measure to lessen
the impact of the Exchequer Rule. 7 The Exchequer Rule resulted
in reversal for almost all error in trials.8 In response, Parliament
enacted a law in 1873 that set forth a standard for assessing
harmless error. Error was reversible only if there was "some
substantial wrong or miscarriage.m~
In the United States, a harmless error doctrine began to emerge
in the 1900s through statutory enactments on both the federal and
7
RoGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 6 (1970); Steven H . Goldberg,
Harmku Error: CoMtitutional Snea4 Thkf, 71 J . CRIM. L. & CRIM. 421, 422 (1980).
8 TRAYNOR,11upra note 7, at 8; Goldberg, 11upra note 7, at 422; Philip J. Mause, Harmku
CoMtitutional Error: The lmplicatioM of Chapman v. California, 53 MINN. L. REV. 519

(1969).
• TRAYNOR, 11upra note 7, at 8-9; Goldberg,11upra note 7, at 422.
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state levels. 10 The statutes spoke in the familiar language of
"affecting the substantial right of a party"11 and "miscarriage of
justice."12
Federal constitutional error was not analyzed as harmless until
the 1960s. In Fahy v. Connecticut, 13 four Justices of the United
States Supreme Court indicated that Fourth Amendment error
should be subjected to a harmless error analysis.14 Subsequently,
in Chapman v. California, 16 the Court subjected a Fifth Amendment error to a harmless error analysis. 18
Chapman is significant both for the standard that was promulgated by the Court for assessing harmless error and for the
understanding of the standard which may be gleaned from the
result reached in that case. The Fifth Amendment error in
Chapman was glaring. The prosecutor argued inferences to the
jury that could be drawn from the defendants' silence, and the trial
court instructed the jury that they could use the defendants' silence
against them. 17 According to the Supreme Court, a harmless error
analysis meant assessing " 'whether there is a reasonable possibili-

10

TRAYNOR, supra note 7, at 14; Goldberg, supra note 7, at 422.
See, e.g., TRAYNOR, supra note 7, at 15 (describing federal statute's language that errors
are harmleas if they do not " 'affect the substantial rights of the parties' •).
11
See, e.g., C. Elliot Keasler, Death and Harmle118MBB: Application ofthe HarmleBB Error
Rule by the Bird and Luccu Courl8 in Death Penalty Ca~es-A Comparison & Critique, 26
U.S.F. L. REv. 41,46 (1991) (describing California's "miscarriage of justice• harmleas error
standard).
IS 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
14
The mlljority held that erroneous admission of illegally seized evidence was prejudicial,
and thus could not be called harmleaa error. ld. at 91-92. While the mlljority sidestepped
the iasue whether Fourth Amendment violations can ever be subject to harmless error
analysis, the four diaaenters urged that the hannleas error standard should be applied here:
whether the unconstitutional evidence could have changed the outcome of the trial. I d. at
95.
II 386 u.s. 18 (1967).
11
Id. at 21-22.
17
The prosecutor "took full advantage of his right under the State Constitution to
comment upon [defendants'] failure to testify, fllling his argument to the jury from beginning
to end with numerous references to their silence and inferences of their guilt resulting
therefrom: ld. at 19.
The trial court instructed the jury that a defendant in a criminal trial may not be
compelled to testify. The jury may also take the defendant's failure to deny or explain
evidence, which he could reasonably be expected to deny or explain, aa tending to indicate
the truth of the evidence and that the more unfavorable inferences to be drawn from the
evidence are the more probable. Id. at 19 n.2.
11
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ty that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the
conviction.' "18 The Court viewed this analysis as synonymous
with a determination that "the error did not contribute to the
verdict beyond a reasonable doubt."19 The standard, thus defined
in Chapman, is also often cited as whether the error is '1larmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. "20
The Court in Chapman concluded that the error of commenting
on the defendants' silence was not harmless. 21 Despite the fact
that there was properly admitted evidence to support the verdict, 22 the Court found that the jurors were likely to have given
significant weight to the impermissible inferences from the
defendants' silence. 23 The emphasis on the inference of guilt from
the defendants' silence was apparent from the number and
intensity of references to the silence. 24 AB a consequence, the
Court felt that "honest, fair-minded jurors might very well have
brought in not-guilty verdicts. "26 Thus, the Court focused on the
impact of the erroneously admitted evidence on the minds of jurors
in reaching a decision and did not particularly address the strength
of the properly admitted evidence. This seminal use of the
harmless error doctrine stands as an example of how to assess
whether an error contributed to the verdict.
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has defined and refined
the parameters of the Chapman harmless error doctrine.26 In a
18
Id. at 24 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)).
•• Id. at 24.
'JI)ld.

21 Jd.
zz Id. at 25 (M
[T)he case • • • presented a reasonably strong 'circumstantial web of evidence'
against petitioners.").
'AJd.
14
ld. at 19.
11
ld. at 26.
• The harmleaa error doctrine diec:ussed in this Article is limited to situations where the
doctrine is applied after the error ia found to exist. Thus, if there ia error because a
confession was coerced in violation of the Constitution, the issue is whether the error was
harmless. There are some constitutional errors, however, that incorporate a harmleBSness
standard into the definition of the error itself. For instance, in order to find ineffective
assistance of counsel in the performance of an attorney in violation of the Sixth Amendment,
there must be action by the attorney that does not fall within a range of"reasonably effective
888istance," and the action must result in prejudice to the defendant. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). If there is no prejudice, there is no error. This is a
different situation conceptually from assessing the harmleBSness of an error such as a
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recent case, the Court limited the applicability of the Chapman
standard for harmless error to direct review of constitutional error,
excluding habeas corpus proceedings.27 The standard for assessing the harmlessness of constitutional error in federal habeas
proceedings is now the same as the harmless error standard for
nonconstitutional errors.28 There would, thus, be a somewhat
different analysis for determining if an error is harmless when the
issues arise in a federal habeas proceeding than the analysis for
determining if an error is harmless on direct review. Nevertheless,
the threshold question of determining if the harmless error doctrine
applies at all implicates the same underlying rationale of the
doctrine in both direct-review and habeas cases.
The threshold issue of when the harmless error doctrine is
applicable, one of the most significant parameters of the Chapman
doctrine, was recently summarized by the Supreme Court in a case
on direct review. In Arizona v. Fulminante, 29 the Court emphasized a distinction developed in a series of cases between "structural" errors and "trial" errors. 30 Harmless error analysis is not
appropriate for "structural" errors that affect the integrity of the
entire process.31 In this instance, the outcome cannot be assumed
to be reliable. 32 Thus, errors such as a biased tribunal or depriva-

coerced confeaaion. There ia no issue whether to apply the harmleu error standard in
asseuing the ineffective Uliatance of counsel because a requirement of harm is written into
the definition of the error.
27
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
18
The Court in Brecht held that the appropriate harmleu error standard for federal
habeas caaea is the standard set forth in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
That standard calla for error to be reversible if the error - 'had substantial and il\iurious
effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1718 (quoting
Kottealws, 328 U.S. at 776). The KotUaJw. standard is considered leu demanding than the
Chapman standard, which presumably results in fewer reversible errors for nonconstitu·
tional errors than for constitutional errors.
• 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
10
ld. at 1264-65.
11
I d. The Court gave two elUUDplea of structural errors: a total deprivation of the right
to counsel at trial, citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); and a judge who is not
impartial, citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). ld.
n -without theae basic protections, a criminal trial cannot reliably aerve its function as
a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be
regarded aa fundamentally fair." Fulminonte, 111 S. Ct. at 1264-65, (quoting Roee v. Clark,
478 u.s. 570, 577-78 (1986)).
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tion of counsel cannot be subjected to a harmless error analysis. 33
There are very few structural errors, however. 34
Almost all errors are classified as "trial" errors. The effect of a
trial error on a verdict can presumably be determined. For
example, Fourth Amendment error, which results in the admission
of illegally seized evidence, is merely trial error. 36 The harm from
the admission of the evidence can arguably be calculated by
separating the unconstitutional evidence from the properly
admitted evidence. According to the Supreme Court, even Fifth
Amendment error, as occurred in Fulminante where there was a
coerced confession admitted at trial, is trial error. 36 The Court
noted in Fulminante that the effect of admitting an involuntary
confession is determinable by assessing the other, properly
admitted evidence.37
Consistent with its expansive view of the harmless error doctrine,
the Supreme Court has extended the Chapman doctrine to the
penalty phase of capital cases. 38 In Satterwhite v. Texas, 39 the
as The Court in FulmiiWnk stated that, with structural errors, "[t)he entire conduct of
the trial from beginning to end is obviously affected.• Id. at 1265. These and other
structural errors comprise "structural defect(s] affect[ing] the framework within which the
trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial proceu itself.• Id.
84
The FulmiiWnk Court lists the following structural errors: the total deprivation of the
right to counsel at trial, the lack of an impartial judge, unlawful exclusion of members of the
defendant's race from a grand jury, the right to self-representation, and the right to public
trial. Id. at 1265. An erroneous instruction on the "beyond a reasonable doubt• standard,
lessening the standard for conviction, was added to the list of structural errors in a recent
decision. 8ft Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2083 (1993).
• FulmiiWnk, 111 S. Ct. at 1263. Moreover. the Court further separates Fourth
Amendment claims from other constitutional errors because the Court views the reason to
exclude the illegally seized evidence as independent of its effect on the reliability of the
verdict.
• Id. at 1265.
11
Id. at 1265-66. The Court viewed an unconstitutional coerced confeuion as
"indistinguishable from that of a confeuion obtained in violation ofthe Sixth Amendment-of
evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment-or of a prosecutor's improper
comment on a defendant's silence at trial in violation of the Fifth Amendment.• I d. at 1265.
The Court rejected the long-held view that the use of a coerced confeuion represented a more
"fundamental• assault on the criminal justice system. Id.
• Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988), was the first mlijor death penalty case to
employ the harmleu error doctrine. However, two years before Satterwhite, in 1986, the
Court addrelled a harmless error iuue in a death penalty proceeding. 8ft Skipper v. South
Carolina. 476 U.S. 1 (1986). In Skipper, however, the Court did not engage in a di8CU88ion
of the applicability of the harmleu error analysis. After finding error in the exclusion of
defendant's proffered witneues, who would have testified to defendant's "good acijustment•
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Court applied a harmless error analysis to the erroneous admission
of a psychiatrist's testimony in violation of the Sixth Amendment.40 The Court was unable to conclude that the evidence "did
not influence the sentencing jury.""1 The error was not harmless.
The psychiatrist's testimony was important in the State's case to
prove that, under the Texas statute, the defendant was " 'a
continuing threat to society.' ""2
The harmless error test used by the Court in Satterwhite
emphasized the impact of the improperly admitted evidence on the
jurors' decision and not the weight of the properly admitted
evidence.~ The Court rejected the Texas court's formulation that
found the State's case "sufficient" without the unconstitutional
evidence.'" The Court stated: "The question, however, is not
whether the legally admitted evidence was sufficient to support the
death sentence, which we assume it was, but rather, whether the
State has proved 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.' ""5

to jail, the Court concluded that the error was reversible error. Id. at 8. The Court was
addressing the harmle88 error issue in a dismissive fashion without directly facing the issue
as in Satterwhite. The Court in Skipper appears to assume for the purposes of argument
that harmle88 error analysis applies, whereas in Satterwhite, the Court had to actually
decide the iBBue .
• 486 u.s. 249 (1988).
40
There was obvious debate on the Court over the applicability of the harmless error
doctrine to an •Estelle• violation, where defense counsel was not advised of a psychiatric
examination to determine future dangerousne88 of the defendant, in violation of the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel at all critical stages. I d . at 252-68. Although
concurring in the judgment, Justices Marshall, Brennan and, in part, Blackmun, disagreed
with the majority's conclusion that harmle88 error should apply in this instance. Id. at 26067 (Marshall, J., concurring). They recognized the different nature of the decision in the
penalty phase, ealling it Ka discretionary, moral judgment involving a balancing of often
intangible factors.• I d. at 265. As a result of the different decision in the penalty phase, the
effect of admitting the psychiatric testimony was too indeterminate. Id. The concurring
Justices wrote: "Divining the effect of psychiatric testimony on a sentencer'a determination
whether death is an appropriate sentence is thus more in the province of soothsayers than
appellate judges.• Id. See also Kenneth A. Zimmem, Note, Satterwhite v. Texas: A Return
to Arbitrary Sentencing?, 42 BAYLOR L. REv. 623 (1990) (criticizing the use of harmless error
doctrine in Satterwhite).
41
Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 260.
42
ld. at 258 (quoting TExAs CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07l(bX2) (West 1988)).
43
Id. at 258-60.
" Id. at 258-59.
46
Id. (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
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Despite other evidence supporting a conclusion of future dangerousness, the Court held that the State could not prove that the
erroneously admitted psychiatric testimony did not contribute to
the verdict. 48
In Clemons v. Mississippi,41 the Court declared it constitutional
to apply a harmless error doctrine to a death verdict where there
was error in weighing an invalid aggravating circumstance.48 The
Court cautioned, however, that it was not mandating the use of a
harmless error test for penalty phase errors. The Court specifically
stated that state courts may find that, in particular situations,
harmless error analysis is "extremely speculative or impossible. ""9
The Supreme Court cases on the harmless error doctrine have
defined the test and provided examples to guide its application. It
is clear that the Court has given its imprimatur to applying the
harmless error doctrine to most errors, including errors arising in

" Id . at 260. There was significant other evidence of future dangerousness introduced.
Besides the testimony of the psychiatrist, Dr. Grigson, the evidence presented at the
sentencing phase included: (1) four prior convictions for violent crimes; (2) character
testimony from eight police officers that Satterwhite was not "peaceful and law-abiding"; (3)
testimony from "Satterwhite's mother's former husband . . . that Satterwhite had once shot
him during an argument•; and (4) testimony from a county psychologist that Satterwhite was
unable "to feel empathy or guilt• and that he would be a "continuing threat to society.• I d.
at 259. Despite all of this evidence, the Court rejected the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals'
approach that the introduction of Dr. Grigson's testimony was harmless because the other
evidence was sufficient to support a sentence of death. ld. at 260. The Court also, however,
in dicta, assumed that the above testimony, without Dr. Grigson's testimony, was sufficient.
Id. at 258.
7
• 494 u.s. 738 (1990).
" In Cle11Wns, the jury was instructed on two aggravating factors: "robbery for pecuniary
gain• and "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel killing.• ld. at 742. The "heinous• factor
was later considered invalid. ld. at 743. It was unclear if the Mississippi Supreme Court
had reweighed the aggravating and mitigating factors or if the court had applied a harmless
error analysis in upholding the death verdict. ld. at 751-52. The United States Supreme
Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of appellate reweighing of factors, but remanded in
this case. Id . On the issue of reweighing, it was unclear if the Mississippi court had in fact
reweighed the one aggravating factor against the mitigating evidence or if it had simply
affirmed on the basis of a per se rule that a death verdict could stand if there was at least
one valid aggravating circumstance. Id. The latter approach would violate the requirement
that the legitimate factors be balanced against one another. ld. Similarly, with the
harmless error analysis, it was unclear if the Mississippi court had properly considered the
Chapman standard. The United States Supreme Court implied that the error was unlikely
to be harmless in this case where the "heinous• factor played a significant role. ld. at 75354.
.ald. at 754.
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the penalty phase of a capital case. There are still difficulties,
however, in going from the concept of harmless error to its
application. In part, the lack of clarity is due to variations in
judging when a particular error "contributes" to the verdict in
question. Another issue, of particular significance in the penalty
phase, is whether the errors should be subject to the harmless error
test at all, or whether the errors should be reversible per se. The
next section addresses both of these issues as major interpretational hurdles in understanding what the Court means by "harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt."
II. INTERPRETATIONAL QUANDARIES

Two major interpretational issues continue to surface. One is the
relationship between the "harm" and the "correct result.»60 If the
"correct result" is reached, should the error ever be viewed as
harmful? The second issue is the basis for the decision to treat
some errors as per se reversible and others as subject to a harmless
error analysis. Is the difference truly a qualitative distinction?
Both of these interpretational ·concerns are particularly important
in applying the harmless error analysis to a penalty proceeding.
The nature of each issue, as developed by the Supreme Court in
non-capital cases and discussed by commentators, is presented in
the following subsections as background to an analysis of the
application of the harmless error doctrine to penalty proceedings in
the next section.
A. HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT?

One of the most troubling aspects in interpreting the Chapman
standard has been the relationship between the "harm" and the
"correct result." In some cases, the Supreme Court has focused on
whether the erroneously included or excluded evidence "contribut10
See, e.g., 'l'RAYNOR, supra note 7, at 43 (di8CU88ing connection between Merror" and
"judgment• in federal statute); Goldberg, supra note 7, at 428 (diacuasing different
interpretations of harmlesa error teet); Stacy & Dayton, supra note 5, at 88-98 (criticizing
Court's approach to harmlesa error and proposing that appropriate analysis would look at
the purpose of the infringed right, whether a new trial can remedy the violation, and
whether reversal eervee a deterrence function).
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ed" to the verdict.61 In other cases, the Court has emphasized
whether the properly admitted evidence was "overwhelming.,jS2
Some commentators view the "contribute" test as quite different
from the "overwhelming" test. 63 Dissenting Justices, too, have
criticized the use of the "overwhelming" test as being untrue to the
"contribute" standard of Chapman.64 And yet, the Court's majori61

See, e.g. , Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967) (• ..-be question is whether
there is a reasonable poeaibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to
the conviction.' • (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963))); Satterwhite v.
Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 258, 260 (1988) (noting that •a reviewing court can make an intelligent
judgment about whether the erroneous admi11ion of psychiatric testimony might have
affected a capital sentencing jury- and holding "it impoeaible to aay beyond a reasonable
doubt that [the psychiatrist's] expert testimony on the i11ue of Satterwhite's future
dangerousne11 did not influence the sentencing jury-); Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct.
1246, 1257-58 (1991) (defining i11ue as whether erroneously admitted confession •did not
contribute• to conviction and rejecting state court's finding that there was overwhelming
evidence against defendant).
61
See, e.g., Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969) (professing to be honoring
Chapman and not •giving too much emphasis to 'overwhelming evidence,' • but concluding
that case was •so overwhelmi~ against Harrington that the error was harmless); Milton
v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1972) (finding erroneously admitted evidence harmless
because of•overwhelming evidence ofguilt• against defendant); Schneble v. Florida, 405 u.s.
427, 431 (1972) (holding Bruton violation harmless because "independent evidence of guilt
. . . [was] overwhelming" and inadmissible confe11ion cumulative).
61
See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 7, at 427-28 (commenting on HaninjJton and Chapman).
Professor Goldberg points out that, if in Ho.rrinjJton the Court focused only upon the
erroneously admitted confession without considering the properly admitted evidence, it would
be almost impoeaible to conclude that the confession •did not contribute to Harrington's
conviction.• Id. Profeaeor Goldberg also points out that the Court had changed the
Chapman teat from one that -rorced the prosecution to show beyond a reasonable doubt that
the error did not contribute to the verdict, into a teet which forced the defendant to show
that the error was of such significance that without it the defendant would be entitled to a
directed verdict of acquittal.• Id. at 428. Thus, if the change in focus from the erroneously
admitted evidence to the properly admitted evidence shifts the burden of demonstrating the
harm of the error to the defendant, almost all errors will be harmless. ld.
See also WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CROONAL PRocEDURE§ 27.6 (2d ed. 1992)
(stating that, while overlap between focusing on effect of the error and properly admitted
evidence is arguably consistent with Chapman, the •acid test• of whether there is real
difference will be a case where properly admitted evidence is overwhelming, but erroneously
admitted evidence was so emphasized that jurors would have viewed it as ~ighly
significant•).
" See, e.g., HaninjJton, 395 U.S. at 255·56 (Brennan, J., diaaenting). Justice Brennan
wrote that the Court, by looking to the overwhelming evidence against Harrington, "today
overrules Chapman 11. Californw: ld. at 255. Justice Brennan clearly viewed the emphasis
on the overwhelming evidence as qualitatively different from Chapman. ld. He believed
Chapman meant -tMt for an error to be 'harmle11' it must have made no contribution to a
criminal conviction.• I d. If not, he was concerned that •constitutional error may be
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ty has claimed that it is applying the Chapman standard in the
same breath that it uses the "overwhelming" test.66
Some of the Court's confusion stems from its use of the word
"contributes." Although Chapman set forth the test of whether the
erroneously admitted evidence did not contribute to the verdict,66
it is the application of that standard in subsequent cases that has
given meaning to the word "contributes." The Court has analyzed
whether erroneously admitted evidence contributed to the verdict
by looking at the character of that evidence.67 The character of
the erroneously admitted evidence in turn has involved looking at
the error in the context of the other evidence at trial.66 This is the
point where the properly admitted evidence becomes a focal point
under the Chapman test. Thus, for example, an analysis of
whether an erroneously admitted confession contributed to the
verdict requires looking at the effect of confessions in general as
well as the other evidence of guilt admitted at trial. 69 Confessions

insulated from attack" if the appellate courts were able to ignore the constitutional error
because of overwhelming evidence. Id. at 256.
151
For example, inHarringron, 395 U.S. at 254, the Court states, "We do not depart from
ChapTTUJn; nor do we dilute it by inference." The Court went on to find, however, that there
was overwhelming evidence against Harrington, and thus the erroneous admission of a
confession implicating Harrington was harmless. Id. at 254.
151
See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
67
Justice Brennan, dissenting in Harrington, referred to the •character and quality" of
the evidence. Harringron, 395 U.S. at 256. The mlijority in SaturwhiU emphasized the
nature of the evidence, focusing on the fact that the erroneously admitted psychiatric
testimony was so critical to the prosecution's case in the penalty phase. Satterwhite v.
Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 261 (1988). The mlijority opinion in Fulminanu also noted the nature
of the erroneously admitted evidence-a confession-as such significant evidence in a
criminal case that the appellate court should have •exercise{d] extreme caution before
determining that the admission ... was harmless.• Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246,
1257-58 (1991).
68
See, e.g., Fulminanh!, 111 S. Ct. at 1258-61 (using the •contributes" standard to analyze
the effect of an erroneously admitted confession in light of all the evidence at trial); see also
Saturwhiu, 486 U.S. at 259-60 (analyzing the lack of significant other evidence of future
dangerousness in determining whether erroneously admitted psychiatric evidence
contributed to a finding of future dangerousness and concluding that the error was not
harmless).
.. See, e.g., Fulminan~. 111 S. Ct. at 1257-61. The Fulminanu Court held that, without
the erroneously admitted confession, the case against the defendant was weak. Id. at 1258.
The Fulminanh! Court looked at the effect of the admission of the confession on the other
evidence at trial and noted that, without the erroneously admitted confession, a second
confession, also admitted in evidence, would have been conaiderably leu convincing. Id. at
1259. The defendant had allegedly confessed to a jailhouse informant and then to the
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are usually considered strong factors in jurors' minds. 80 At the
same time, there may be circumstances where a court could
conclude that a particular confession was inconsequential to the
jury's decision.61 The nature of the constitutional error and the
properly admitted evidence at trial are, thus, intertwined in the
Chapman standard.
Although intertwined, the Court's emphasis on one of the two
threads-the nature of the constitutional error or the properly
admitted evidence-significantly affects the result. When the Court
has focused on the erroneously admitted or excluded evidence,
emphasizing the significance of that evidence and analyzing
whether that evidence "contributed" to the verdict, the Court has

informant's wife. Id. at 1258-59. The confession to the jailhouse informant was erroneously
admitted at trial because it was found to have been coerced. ld. at 1252. The confession to
the wife was suspect both because the context made it unlikely defendant would confess to
her and because she had reasons to make up the confession to support the story of her
jailhouse informant husband. ld. at 1259.
The Court further analyzed the effect of the admission of the impermissible confession on
the sentencing decision and again found that the credibility of the second confession would
have been doubtful without the first confession. ld. at 1260. With only the second, less
credible confession, the Court believed there would be insufficient evidence to support an
aggravating circumstance. ld.
80
See, e.g., id. at 1257 (referring to defendant's confession as " 'probably the most
probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him' " and noting that
" 'confessions have profound impact on the jury' " (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S.
123, 139-40 (1968))).
1
'
See, e.g., Harrington, 395 U.S. at 254 (finding the unconstitutional admission of
codefendants' confessions that implicated defendant was harmless error in light of the
"overwhelming" evidence against defendant). But see id. at 257 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(arguing strenuously that one could not conclude that the two codefendants' confessions "did
not contribute to Harrington's conviction"). See al8o Goldberg, aupra note 7, at 427.
ProfeBBOr Goldberg convincingly points out that, if one looks at the nature of the evidence,
the codefendants' confessions, "[i)t is difficult to imagine how any court . .. could determine
beyond a reasonable doubt that the confessions ... did not contribute to Harrington's convic·
tion-particularly when those confessions described the fourth participant as 'the white
guy.' " Id. at 257. Harrington was the only white man charged out of the group of
defendants. Harrington, 395 U.S. at 250. See alao Fulminanu, 111 S. Ct. at 1258 ("'n the
case of a coerced confession .. • the risk that the confession is unreliable, coupled with the
profound impact that the confession has upon the jury, requires a reviewing court to exercise
extreme caution before determining that the admission of the confession at trial was
harmless.").
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found that the error was not harmless.62 In contrast, when the
Court has focused on the properly admitted evidence and analyzed
whether that evidence created an overwhelming case against the
defendant, the Court has found the error harmless.63 The differing emphasis by the Court may be due to philosophical differences
about the goal of the harmless error doctrine.64
According to the Court in a recent case, the goal of the harmless
error doctrine is to keep the judicial system focused on the
defendant's guilt or innocence through a fair, but not error free
trial.66 In Fulminante, the Court stated:
[T]he harmless-error doctrine is essential to preserve
the 'principle that the central purpose of a criminal
trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence, and promotes public
respect for the criminal process by focusing on the
11

See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 26 (1967) (holding that the Court could
not conclude that improper.comments on defendants' silence did not contribute to verdict);
Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 260 (holding that the Court could not conclude that a psychiatrist's
testimony regarding defendant's future dangerousness "did not influence the sentencing
jury"); Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1258-59 (finding erroneously admitted confeuion affected
believability of only other significant evidence against defendant; therefore, admission of
confession waa not harmless beyond reasonable doubt); .ee al80 Roy v. Hall, 521 F.2d 120 (1st
Cir. 1975) (analyzing thoroughly the intertwining of ideas of"overwhelming evidence• with
the "contributes• test). The Roy court found that, even though there were two other
•confessions: admiuibility of a third confession could not be harmless error. Id. at 124. The
court first refuted the argument that the evidence was overwhelming by going through all
the evidence for and against defendant. /d. at 122. The court next looked at four pouible
ways that the third confeuion waa significant in establishing the case against the defendant.
Id. at 122-23. The court then found a reasonable possibility that the confession would have
contributed to the verdict. Id. at 123. Despite the finding on harmleu error, the court
ultimately found that there was no error in admitting the confeuion. /d. at 124.
13 See, e.g., Harrington, 395 U.S. at 254 (finding evidence against defendant "so
overwhelmi~); Milton v. Wainright, 407 U.S. 371, 373 (1972) (noting "overwhelming
evidence of petitioner's guilt•); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 431 (1972) (finding
"'independent evidence of guilt here overwhelmi~).
14
For example, compare the mlijority view in Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1265-66 (rejecting
either a deterrence rationale or a concept that an involuntary confession is so "fundamental"
a right in the course of holding that the harmless error analysis applies to an involuntary
confession) with the diuenting view, id. at 1253-57 (White, J., diuenting) (stating that
regardless of the ability to aueu the impact of the error on the verdict, some rights
represent "'important values that are unrelated to the truth-seeking function of the trial,"
rendering harmle11 error analysis inappropriate).
• Id. at 1246.
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underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the
virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error.>66
By equating a "fair" trial with one that correctly determines guilt
or innocence, the Court has justified its emphasis on the overwhelming evidence of guilt. 67 In contrast, dissenting Justices have
viewed a "fair" trial as incorporating a value in the process or a
particular right. For example, the dissenters in Fulminante would
have found the admission of a coerced confession reversible per se
because a verdict based on such evidence would be "inconsistent
with the thesis that ours is not an inquisitorial system of criminal
justice.,sa
The application of the harmless error doctrine shifts with the
viewpoint of the court. If the goal is a correct determination of
guilt or innocence, then many errors can be found harmless as long
as there is sufficient justification for the verdict. If the goal
includes honoring an inherent value in the right denied, then
harmless error cannot be found as often. Otherwise the right
denied will be slighted. 69 The same language from Chapman,
thus, is interpreted differently based upon the underlying assumptions about a "fair" trial.
Another criticism of looking at the overwhelming nature of the
evidence against the defendant is that the appellate court is
usurping the jury's function. If the appellate court is analyzing
whether the jury in a particular case reached the correct result, the
court is necessarily re-evaluating the same evidence that the jurors

• Id. at 1264 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)).
87
Ogletree, supra note 5, at 162-63.
N Fulminanre, 111 S. Ct. at 1256 (White, J., dissenting); Bee also Ogletree, 11upra note 5,
at 163-72. While criticizing both the logic of applying harmless error to involuntary
confessions that will almost, if not always, have contributed to the verdict and the logic and
precedent for considering only the accuracy of verdict concerns, Professor Ogletree cogently
expresses the societal concern, apart from accuracy, for a system free from reprehensible
police techniques. Id. See also Stacy & Dayton, 11upra note 5, at 91-98 (proposing analysis
that focuses on purpose of the right infringed).
•This was Justice Brennan's concern in Harrington, where he noted that an •overwhelming" evidence test would mean that the constitutional rights of the defendants would be
unprotected. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 256 (1969) (Brennan, J ., dissenting);
Bee also Goldberg, supra note 7, at 438 ("The result of the harmless constitutional error
doctrine at the trial court level is to encourage the diminution of rights against the
government for all individuals against whom the state has an overwhelming case.•).
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had to evaluate.70 The problem with the appellate court conducting this evaluation is that the appellate justices did not hear or see
the live testimony. They cannot evaluate the demeanor of the
witnesses. 71 Moreover, our system is based on lay jurors making
the factfinding determinations, with the appellate courts reviewing
errors of law. 72 The overwhelming evidence approach skews the
delicate balance between the trial and appellate roles.73
B. HARMLESS OR PER SE REVERSmLE?

The Supreme Court's approach to harmless error has also been
criticized for making a distinction between "structural" and "trial"
errors. The Court has created a distinction between a structural
error that affects the "framework" of the trial and a trial error that
affects the "process" of the trial. 74 The "framework" includes an
unbiased judge, counsel or self-representation, a public trial, a
grand jury selected without race discrimination, 76 and an instruction that accurately requires the standard of beyond a reasonable
doubt.76 The "process" includes evidence introduced at trial and
instructions given to the jury.77 The distinction is critical because
trial errors are subject to the harmless error doctrine, but structur-

70

See Goldberg, supra note 7, at 429-31 (describing appellate court that focuses on the
properly admitted evidence as Kappellate jury" and explaining that appellate court is
operating as the Kprimary factfmdero if it is assessing whether actual evidence at trial was
"overwhelmi~).
11

See id. at 430 (describing demeanor only available to first-hand juror observation).
Appellate courts ordinarily only review the sufficiency or weight of the evidence as a
matter of law. See id. at 427-32 (discu88ing usurpation of jwy).
11
See id. at 429. Professor Goldberg states:
When an appellate court tests for harmle88ness by reviewing the record
to determine whether the remainder of the evidence is so overwhelming
that the error did not contribute to the verdict, it sits as an appellate
jury... . An appellate court defies common sense when it steps out of its
traditional role as a reviewing court and attempts to operate as a
primary factfinder.
72

Id.
74
See Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1264-65 (1991) (di&CUBsing constitutional
errors which are not subject to harmle88 error standards); see also infra notes 29-37 and
accompanying text (di8CU88ing Fulminanu).
76
Fulminanu, 111 S. Ct. at 1265.
7
• Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993).
11
Fulminanu, 111 S. Ct. at 1263.
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al errors are per se reversible.
Professor Ogletree has pointed out that the premise underlying
the distinction between structural and trial errors is inaccurate. 78
As he discusses, the Court assumes that it is possible, or at least
easier, to determine whether the result is correct if the error is a
trial error and that it is impossible, or very difficult, to determine
whether the result is correct if the error is a structural error.79
Professor Ogletree points out that, even with the structural error
of a biased judge, the evidence against the defendant could be so
overwhelming that there is no question about the correctness of the
result.80 Thus, the assumption underlying the distinction between
structural and trial errors-that one cannot determine the correctness of the result with structural errors-is simply wrong.
Professor Ogletree explains that the assumption is flawed because
the "structure,. referred to in "structural erro~ is a fair trial.81 In
tum, fair trial is defined in terms of the correctness of the result.82 Thus, in the end, a structural error is not very different
from a trial error.83
The Court has avoided the problem in logic identified by
Professor Ogletree by focusing on the labels instead of the underlying reasoning for distinguishing trial and structural errors. The
Court has acknowledged the reasoning that errors should be per se
reversible when the prejudice is difficult to calculate, but only when
describing accepted structural errors. For example, in Fulminante,
the Court stated that structural errors "defy analysis by 'harmlesserror' standards..a. and that a structural error means that the trial
" 'cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination
of guilt or innocence.' ..s6 In contrast, the Court has treated the
speculative nature of the harm as merely an aspect of whether the
error in the particular case is harmless when speaking of trial
errors. For example, in Satterwhite, although cautioning that it

18

Ogletree, auprc note 5, at 161.
ld. at 159-60.
10
ld. at 165.
II Jd. at 164.
18

•rd.
81

ld.
Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1264-65 (1991).
86
ld. (quoting Roae v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986)).
114
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might be difficult to assess the impact of error in a capital penalty
phase, the Court found it constitutional to apply a harmless error
analysis to the evidentiary error of unconstitutionally admitted
psychiatric evidence. 86
The Court•s analysis has become one of categorizing errors as
structural or trial, based on an assumption that the harm of trial
errors can be assessed by evaluating the other evidence at trial.
The reasoning that an error should be treated as per se reversible
if it is difficult or nearly impossible to calculate its effect is
submerged in trial-structural nomenclature. The speculative
impact of some errors simply makes it more difficult to declare an
error harmless, but does not foreclose the inquiry.87
Similarly, the laudable idea that certain errors affect such
fundamental rights that they cannot be considered harmless is now
an abandoned thought. The significance of the right is analyzed
through the structural-trial error dichotomy. Fulminante is the
best example of this phenomenon. The Court analyzed the use of
a coerced confession at trial in violation of the Fifth Amendment-long considered so sacrosanct that no such error could be
harmless-as trial evidence. 86 The Court focused only on the
confession as one piece of evidence that could be segregated from
the rest of the evidence and its impact thus assessed. The
Fulminante decision is certainly a powerful indicator that the Court
is no longer valuing the nature of the right involved in its determi11

Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 258 (1988).
See, e.g., id. at 260-67 (Marshall, J ., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan and, in part, by Justice Blackmun,
criticized the ~Il~Vority's conclusion that the harmleaa error doctrine should apply in
SatterwhiU. The dissenters believed that a harmless error analysis should never apply to
the admi88ion of psychiatric testimony in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
established in Estelle 11. Smith. ld. (citing Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981)).
Emphasizing both the nature of the decision in the penalty phase and the need for greater
reliability in a death case, Justice Marshall argued that the penalty phase decision called
for •a profoundly moral evaluation of the defendant's character and crime." ld. at 261.
According to Justice Marshall, a reviewing court, thus, engages in •a dangerously speculative
enterprise• in "predicting the reaction of a sentencer to a proceeding untainted by
constitutional error on the basis of a cold record.• /d. at 262. Justice Marshall also voiced
concern with the reliability of a death sentence, noting that harmle88 error analysis impinges
on reliability by allowing a court to substitute its judgment for what a trier would have done
for an actual judgment by a constitutionally untainted sentencer. ld.
81
See suprc notes 36-37 and accompanying text (di8CU88ing effect of admi88ion of
involuntary confe88ion).
17
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nation whether to apply the harmless error analysis.89
The Court is, thus, placing great reliance on the structural-trial
error categories for applying harmless error rather than an analysis
of the symbolic significance of the right infringed. Interpretation
of the structural-trial categories is resulting in subjecting more
constitutional errors to the harmless error analysis. Few constitutional violations affect the framework, or structure, of the trial, as
defined by the Court. This categorization is coupled with an
increasing emphasis on equating harmless error with the correct
result. The interpretation of the Chapman "contributes to the
verdict" standard, although unsettled, appears to be moving in the
direction of analyzing how overwhelming the case is against the
defendant. Both of these ongoing interpretational quagmires affect
the analysis of harmless error in the context of the penalty phase
of a capital case. The next section addresses the use of the
harmless error doctrine, with its rationale and current interpretational issues, in the penalty phase.
Ill. THE HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS IN THE PENALTY PHAsE

In assessing the application of the harmless error analysis to a
capital penalty phase, there are two critical areas of inquiry. First,
should a harmless error analysis be applied to almost all penalty
phase errors in the pervasive manner that it is applied to guilt
phase errors? Second, when a harmless error analysis is applied
to penalty phase errors, how should a court analyze the impact of
an error on the penalty phase decisional process? Both questions
hinge on an understanding of the difference in the nature of the
decisional processes in the guilt and penalty phases. The discussion of these issues is subdivided into three subsections. The first
sets forth a description of a penalty proceeding and the nature of

11
Profe880r Ogletree and Professors Stacy and Dayton suggest that the better approach
would be to analyze the purposes of the right at stake in lieu of focusing exclusively on the
accuracy of the result. Their approaches would value the right involved as well as alleviate
the logical flaws in the structural-trial dichotomy. See Ogletree, supra note 5, at 168-72
(raiaing iaeue of•societal interest• in protecting constitutional rights); Stacy & Dayton, supra
note 5, at 91-98 (proposing an analysis that would consider (1) the impact of the error on the
purpose of the right; (2) whether -redoing the proceu• will rectify the error; and (3) the
import of deterrence).
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the decisionmaking. The second subsection focuses on how the
rationale of the doctrine supports applying the harmless error
doctrine differentially to the penalty phase. The third subsection
takes a practical look at how a court should assess the harm of an
error in the penalty phase.
A. THE PENALTY PHASE DECISION

The penalty phase in a capital case is typically an evidentiary
proceeding separate from the guilt phase.90 The proceeding is
usually presented to the same jury that sat for the guilt phase,91
although a different jury may be impaneled,92 or a judge alone can
preside.93 The prosecutor's role is to establish at least one statutory aggravating factor. Typical aggravating factors include murders
committed during a serious felony, such as a robbery; committed for
pecuniary gain; committed to prevent capture on another crime; or
committed with a great risk of death to others besides the victim.94 In those jurisdictions where the aggravating factor is

10

See, e.g. , CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(a) (Deering 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1)
(West 1985 & Supp. 1993); TEx. CRIM. PRoc. CoDE ANN. art. 37.071 (West Supp. 1993).
1
' See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(c) (Msarne jury" for penalty); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
921.141(1) (penalty proceeding before ~rial jury"); TEx. CJUM. PRoc. CODE ANN. art. 37.071,
§ 2(a) (penalty proceeding before the ~rial jury").
" See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE § 190.4(c) (new jury can be impaneled if Mgood cause• to
di8miaa original jury); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 921.141(1) (new jury may be impaneled ifthere is
an Mimpouibility or inability" for trial jury to continue); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:ll-3(c)(1) (West
Supp. 1993) (court may discharge guilt phase jury for M
good cause• and impanel new jury).
" States are not uniform in their approaches to waiver of jury. For example, in some
states, the defendant can waive the jury, although the prosecution may have to consent to
the waiver. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT § 565.006 (Vernon Supp. 1993) (if state consents,
defendant may waive penalty phase jury). In some states, the defendant can waive the jury,
but only if there was a plea or a trial to the bench in the guilt phase. See, e.g., CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 16 and CAL. PENAL CoDE § 190.4(b) (if defendant pleaded guilty or was tried by
judge alone in guilt phase, defendant may waive penalty jury with consent of state); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1) (ifdefendant pleaded guilty or waived jury for guilt phase, defendant
may also waive penalty phase jury); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:ll-3(c)(1) (if defendant pleaded
guilty or waived jury for guilt phase, court may conduct penalty proceeding without jury on
motion of defendant and with consent of prosecution).
N An aggravating factor must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL
CODE § 190.4(a); N .J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:ll-2(c)(2)(a). Aggravating factors, which elevate
murder to capital murder, are statutorily listed. Typical aggravating factors include whether
defendant baa been convicted of another murder; whether the defendant purposely or
knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim; whether
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established in the guilt phase, the prosecutor in the penalty phase
may present other aggravating evidence, such as the defendanfs
prior convictions.96 The defense role in the penalty phase is to
present mitigating evidence, such as physical or mental problems,
absence of a criminal history, or youth.96 Although mitigating

the murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved
torture, depravity of mind, or aggravated assault to the victim; whether the defendant
committed the murder as consideration for receipt of anything of pecuniary value; whether
the defendant procured the murder by payment or promise of anything of pecuniary value;
whether the murder was committed to escape detection, apprehension, trial, punishment, or
confinement for another offense; whether the murder was committed while the defendant
was committing, attempting, or escaping a murder, robbery, sexual a88ault, arson, burglary,
or kidnapping; whether the victim was a public servant engaged in the performance of his
official duties or because of the victim's status as a public servant. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:ll3(cX4). Florida's statutory factors comprise another representative list: the capital felony
was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment; the defendant was previously
convicted of another capital felony or felony involving the use or threat of violence to the
person; the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many people; the capital
felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in, was an accomplice, was
attempting, or was in flight after committing robbery, sexual battery, arson, burglary,
kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or bombing; the capital felony was committed for purpose of
avoiding or preventing arrest or escaping from custody; the capital felony was committed for
pecuniary gain; the capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the exercise of any
governmental function or law enforcement; the capital felony was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel; the capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated
manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. FLA. STAT. ANN. f 921.141(5).
16
In some states, the •aggravating factor" must be proved during the guilt phase of the
trial. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE f 190.4; TEx. PENAL CoDE ANN. f 19.03 (West 1989 &
Supp. 1993). In other states, the aggravating factor is proved during the penalty phase. See,
e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. f 2C:ll-3(c)(2Xa).
16
Some states list a variety of factors that may be either aggravating or mitigating. See,
e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE f 190.3(a)-(k). California's statute includes the following: the
circumstances of crime for which defendant was convicted, including special circumstances
perf 190.1; criminal activity which involved use or attempted use of force by defendant;
prior felony convictions; extreme mental or emotional disturbance during offense; the victim's
participation in defendant's homicidal conduct or act; whether defendant reasonably believed
circumstances provided a moral justification or extenuation; whether defendant acted under
extreme dure88 or substantial domination of another person; whether at time of offense the
defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease, defect, or effects of
intoxication; defendant's age at time of crime; whether defendant was an accomplice to the
offense or his relative minor participation; or any other circumstance which extenuates the
gravity of the crime even though it not be a legal excuse. Id.
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circumstances may be statutorily listed,97 the defense is also
entitled to present evidence relevant to nonstatutory mitigating
factors.98 Closing arguments are presented as in a typical trial. 99
The most unusual feature of the penalty phase is the task for the
jury or judge. Their decision involves a determination whether
aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors and, therefore,
death is warranted. 100 The decision is a judgment call on the
relative weight of factors, unlike the assessment of the existence of
facts in the guilt phase.101 The penalty phase decision, therefore,

17
Typical statutory lists of mitigating factors include: "the defendant was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance insufficient to constitute a defense to
proeecution; the victim solicited, participated in, or consented to the conduct which resulted
in his death; the age of the defendant at the time of the murder; the defendant's capacity to .
appreciate the wrongfulnesa of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement of
the law was significantly impaired as the result of mental disease or defect or intoxication,
but not to a degree sufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution; the defendant was under
unusual and substantial duress insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution; the
defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity; the defendant rendered
substantial aaaistance to the State in the proeecution of another person for the crime of
murder; or any other factor relevant to the defendant's character or record or the
circumstances of the offense.• N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:ll-3(cX5). See FLA. ANN. STAT. §
921.141(6) for a similar list.
11
See, e.g., Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987) (reversing death sentence because
improper instruction to jury excluded consideration of nonstatutory mitigating factors and
citing line of cases recognizing constitutional requirement that nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances be considered: Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986); Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)).
• Gary Goodpaster, TM Trial for Life: Effective Asst.ta~ ofCounMl in Death PeTUJlty
Ccues, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 299, 334-38 (1983); Roy B. Herron, Defendi"'I Life in Tennessee
Death PeTUJlty Cases, 51 TENN. L. REv. 681, 732-763 (1984).
100
The actual formulation of the decision varies. In some states, the sentencer must
decide if the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. See, e.g.,
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603(aX2) (Michie Supp. 1991); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3; N.J . STAT.
ANN. § 2C:ll.a(cX3); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(DX1) (Anderson 1993). Arkansas
additionally requires that the sentencer find that the •[a]ggravating circumstances justify
a sentence of death beyond a reasonable doubt.• ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603(aX3). In other
states, the basic weighing formulation is reversed, requiring the sentencer to find that there
are mitigating circumstances that outweigh the aggravating circumstances. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN.§ 921.141(2)-(3); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 519-l(g) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030(4X3) (Vernon Supp. 1993). Texas has an unusual formulation
where death can be imposed only if the jury answers three specific questions affirmatively.
TEx. CRIM. PRoc. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(b).
101
Like the formulation of the weighing decision, the precise judgment call varies, too.
See, e.g., Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990)(upholding Pennsylvania statute that
required sentencer to impose death if aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating
circumstances). In other states, the sentencer is expresaly authorized to impose life
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allows for more individual variation in the reasoning for the
decision than is permitted in the guilt phase.102
The use of the mitigating factors by individual jurors also inserts
variability into the process.103 Each juror may assess the value
of a given mitigating circumstance individually and may weigh that
mitigating circumstance as he or she chooses. 104 For example,
suppose the jury has found an aggravating circumstance of a double
homicide to exist. The defense has presented three possible
mitigating factors: (1) the defendant was abused as a child; (2) the
defendant was addicted to drugs; and (3) the defendant is very
remorseful. Juror 1 could decide that all three mitigating factors
together outweigh the aggravating factor. Juror 2 could decide that
the child abuse alone outweighs the aggravating factor. Juror 3
could decide that the child abuse and the addiction are strong
mitigating factors, that the defendant was not really remorseful,
and conclude that the mitigating factors do not outweigh the

imprisonment if that is deemed the appropriate penalty, regardleBB of the outcome of the
weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See, e.g., ARK. CoDE ANN. ~ 5-4603(aX3) (sentencer must find that •[a]ggravating circumstances justify a sentence of death
beyond a reasonable doubt"); Mo. ANN. STAT. ~ 565.030(4X4) (sentencer may decide, even
after weighing proceBB, "under all of the circumstances not to 888eBB and declare the
punishment of death"); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 83-84 (Utah, 1982) (holding sentencer
must decide, in addition to finding that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating
circumstances, that death ia appropriate penalty beyond a reaaonable doubt), cert. denied,
459 u.s. 988 (1982).
For a more extensive diBCUBaion of the statutory variations, see Linda E. Carter,A Beyond
tJ ReaiiOTJtJbk Doubt SttJndtJrd in Death Perw.lty Proceeding•: A Neglected Ekment of
FtJirMBB, 52 Omo ST. L. J . 195 (1991).
101
Greater individual variation in the penalty reaaoning is, in large part, a result of the
requirement that there be individualized consideration of the defendant and his or her
circumtJtancea before a death sentence may be imposed. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978). For further analysis of the seeming inconsistency between individualized
consideration of the defendant and the need to avoid arbitrarineBB, see Scott E. Sundby, The
Loclrett PtJra.do%: Reconciling Guided Di8cretion tJnd Unguided MitigtJtion in Ct~pittJl
Sentencing, 38 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1147 (1991) (finding consistency in the dual constitutional
requirements or individual consideration through mitigating circumstances and the
channeling of discretion through regulating aggravating circumstances).
101
&e WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY 1N THE NlNETlES 73-92 (1991) (di8CU811ing
the effect or almost unlimited mitigating evidence in the penalty phase).
106
See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 442-43 (1990) (holding it unconstitutional
to require jurors to find unanimously that a mitigating circumstance exists and that each
juror is entitled to consider mitigating evidence he or abe considers relevant to the penalty
decision).
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aggravating factors. 106 The result of the latitude given to the
jurors is that there is much greater uncertainty in how a piece of
evidence will be used.
The nature of the decision in the penalty phase is, thus, quite
different from the decision in the guilt phase. In the guilt phase of
a capital case, as in any other criminal trial, the jury or judge must
reach a decision whether certain facts exist. Suppose, for example,
that in order to convict a defendant of murder in the first degree,
the factfinder must find that the defendant caused the death of a
human being, with a purpose to kill, and with premeditation and
deliberation. 106 The factfmder is ultimately asked whether each
element exists or not. Although the factfinder is making value
judgments about the strength of the evidence to support each
element, the ultimate finding is whether the facts that the
defendant killed, with intent, and with premeditation and deliberation are true or not.
In contrast, the sentencer in a capital case must first find
whether certain facts exist and then apply a value judgment to
those facts. The judge or jury in the penalty phase must decide
whether the evidence is convincing that an aggravating circumstance exists and whether any mitigating circumstances exist. 107
These assessments by the judge or jury are essentially comparable
to the factfmder's task in the guilt phase in decidingifthe elements
of the crime exist.108 The sentencer, however, is asked to do
106
See, e.g., id. at 451 (Blackmun, J ., concurring) (describing a scenario from Mills v.
Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 374 (1986), where "all12 jurors agreed that sonu mitigating factors
were present, and outweighed the factors in aggravation, but the jury was not unanimous
as to the existence of any particular mitigating circumstance• as example of unconstitutional
limitation on the consideration of mitigation).
106
States vary in the formulation of their murder statutes. See, e.g. , Omo REv. CODE
ANN. § 2903.01(A) (Anderson 1992) ("No person shall purposely, and with prior calculation
and design, cause the death of another.•).
107
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(a); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:ll-3(c)(3) (West Supp.
1993); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(B).
101
Although the decision of whether a mitigating factor exists is comparable to finding
an element of a crime, there is one striking difference. Unlike a trial where all the jurors
must agree that an element exists, jurors in the penalty phase are free to decide individually
whether mitigating circumstances exist or not. See infra text accompanying notes 125-127
(diSCUBsing McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990), where the Court held it reversible
error to require jurors to find a mitigating circumstance unanimously). There are also more
subjective evaluations in determining if a mitigating circumstance exists than are typical in
determining if an element of a crime exists. See WHITE, •upro note 103, at 75 (noting that
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more. The sentencer is asked to take the facts found-the aggravating and mitigating circumstances-and balance them against
each other. 109 The balancing is virtually unguided.110 The sentencer must make a value judgment whether one group of facts
(aggravating circumstances) is greater, the same as, or less than
another group of facts (the. mitigating circumstances). 111 Nothing
comparable is asked of the factfmder in the guilt phase. The
weighing in the penalty phase would be similar to asking the
factfinder in the guilt phase to decide if, given that the elements of
murder exist and that the elements of self-defense exist, either
should outweigh the other. Needless to say, the factfinder in the
guilt phase is not asked to make such a judgment call. The jury
instructions will state that self-defense prevails if its elements are
satisfied. 112 The jurors are asked only to assess the existence of
the elements of the defense and not whether, in their judgment, the
defense should outweigh the crime.
The nature of the decision in the penalty phase-the value-based
judgment call-cannot be ignored in applying the harmless error
doctrine. The validity of the harmless error doctrine is based on
the assumption that the effect of the error is determinable.113 If
the effect of the error on the verdict is minimal, the error is
harmless. If the effect of the error on the verdict is too speculative,
the reliability of the verdict is suspect. Thus, if the defendant is
denied counsel during a trial, the effect of that error is so pervasive
mitigating circumstances call for "subjective judgments; such as "whether the defendant
played a relatively minor role in a crime" or "whether he was under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance at the time of a killing").
108
See supra text accompanying notes 100-101.
110
See WHITE, supra note 103, at 76.
m See WHITE, supra note 103, at 75-76 (recognizing "value judgment" in weighing
aggravating and mitigating circumstances); Mark Costanzo & Sally Costanzo, Jury Decision
Maki11(1 in the Capital Pe114lty PlwM, 16 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 185, 189-90 (1992) (suggesting
penalty decision is •value-laden decision" which will be influenced by "fairness or group
values; whereas guilt decision is "factual" and influenced by "facts and information"); id. at
197-99 (noting penalty decision is "qualitatively different" from guilt determination); James
C. Scoville, Comment, Deadly Mistakes: Harmless Error in Capital Sentenci11(1, 54 U. CHI.
L. REv. 740, 755-56 (1987) (proposing sentencer decide the importance of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances).
112
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 197 (noting situations where self-defense is justifiable
homicide).
m See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993) (finding harmless error doctrine not
appropriate where error is "unquantifiable and indeterminate").
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and difficult to calculate that the error cannot be declared harmless. The effect of an error in the weighing decision in the penalty
phase of a capital case is as speculative a proposition as guessing
what the effect is of trying a defendant without counsel. The
individual choices jurors make about the existence of mitigating
circumstances coupled with the unique weighing of factors creates
a proceeding fundamentally different from a guilt trial.
An analysis of harmless error in the penalty phase should be
refmed to take into account the unique characteristics of the
decision. The next two subsections discuss an approach to the use
of the harmless error doctrine in the penalty phase that considers
both the rationale of the doctrine and the nature of the penalty
phase decision.
B. HARMLESS ERROR DOCTRINE RARELY APPROPRIATE IN PENALTY
PHASE

The harmless error doctrine was developed and applied to
constitutional error for sound reasons. If the Supreme Court is
going to base its application of the harmless error doctrine on
allegiance to its rationale, however, the doctrine must be used
sparingly, if at all, in the penalty phase of a capital case. 114 The
Supreme Court recognized the difficulty of applying the harmless
error doctrine in capital cases in both SatterwhitP. v. Texas 115 and
Clemons v. Mississippi. 116 The Court's dichotomy between structural117 and trial 118 errors, developed to identify those errors
where the harmless error doctrine applies, must be interpreted
based on the nature of the penalty phase decision.
Structural error, as understood in Fulminante, should remain
reversible per se as in a typical trial. 119 Thus, a biased judge or
m See Scoville, supra note 111, at 757 (suggesting harmless error doctrine should not
apply to either constitutional or nonconstitutional error in penalty phase).
Ill 486 u.s. 249 (1988).
111
494 U.S. 738 (1990); IIH cU.o supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text (discusaing
difficulty in applying harmless error doctrine).
117
Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1265 (1991).
111
/d. at 1264.
111
See supra notes29-34 and accompanying text. But see Scoville, supra note 111, at 757,
(suggesting that because court can determine the effect of structural errors, harmless error
analysis would be more appropriate for those errors than it is for evidentiary errors).
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denial of counsel in the penalty phase should result in an automatic reversal. 120 These errors, which affect the framework of the
penalty proceeding, are too invasive of the entire process to apply
the harmless error doctrine reliably. 121
Additionally, however, the category of reversible per se errors
should include a broader array of errors in the penalty phase than
in the guilt phase. Structural errors are reversible per se because
they pervade the entire process, rendering it difficult to assess the
effect of the error. 122 Thus, if the reasoning underlying the
separation of structural from trial errors has any vitality, there is
a sound case to be made that errors which contaminate the entire
penalty phase process must be reversible per se as structural
errors. Indeed, the Court in Clemons appeared to anticipate that
errors in the penalty phase might create a problem in applying the
harmless error doctrine. 123 The Court encouraged an analysis by
the state courts of the appropriateness of using a harmless error
analysis. 12• Consequently, where it is difficult to determine the
effect of an error, legitimate grounds exist to treat the error as
structural, even if the same error would be a trial error in the guilt
phase. Instructional error and evidentiary error provide useful
examples of the need to evaluate penalty phase error as reversible
per se independent of the status of such error in a guilt proceeding.
Instructional error in the penalty phase, particularly error in
instructing the jury on how to deal with aggravating and mitigating
factors, has a more systemic effect in that phase than does an error
in instructing the jury on how to assess evidence in the guilt phase.
The Supreme Court recognized the systemic effect of an instructional .e rror in the penalty phase in McKoy v. North Carolina. 126 In
McKoy, the Court held that it was reversible error to instruct jurors

uo These are the examples of structural errors given by the Court in Fulminante. See
supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
121
See supra notes 32-33 (diBCUBsing holding of Fulminante Court).
122
See supra notes 32-33 (diBCUBsing holding of Fulminante Court).
123
Clemons v. Miuissippi, 494 U.S. 738, 754 (1990).
U4 ld. (Min some situations, a state appellate court may conclude that peculiarities in a
case make appellate reweighing or harmless error analysis extremely speculative or
impoBBible.").
136
494 U.S. 433 (1990); see also Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) (holding
instructions were unconstitutional where it was pouible for jury to understand that they
could only consider mitigating circumstances found unanimously).

152

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:125

that they had to find a mitigating circumstance unanimously in
order to consider it. 126 Such an instruction, if followed, might
have unconstitutionally precluded the consideration of mitigating
circumstances determined to be important by the individual
jurors. 127 Other than in an extreme case, such as in McKoy
where jurors were literally precluded from considering mitigating
evidence, however, lower courts generally have failed to consider
the different nature of a penalty proceeding in assessing the impact
of an erroneous instruction.
For example, in Delap v. Dugger, 128 the Florida Supreme Court
applied the harmless error analysis to an erroneous jury instruction
without considering the nature of the decision as a value judgment.
The trial court had instructed the jury only on statutory mitigating
circumstances, leaving the impression that the jury could not
consider nonstatutory mitigating factors.129 The Florida Supreme
Court found the error harmless. 130 According to the court, the
error was offset by the introduction of the nonstatutory mitigating
evidence, emphasis by the prosecutor that the evidence was
relevant, and the lack of any direct instruction by the court to
disregard such evidence. 131 In addition, the court found that the
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances of defendant's " 'acceptable' "
"trial and prison conduct" and " 'perhaps' " "some remorse" were
inconsequential given the five aggravating factors. 132
The latter reasoning indicates that the Florida court was
implicitly assuming that all jurors would dismiss the nonstatutory
mitigating evidence. Each juror can assess the mitigating factors
differently in different combinations, however, and is ultimately
making an independent value judgment about the penalty. As a
result, the potential harm from excluding the mitigating evidence
cannot be dismissed so easily. The mitigating evidence that the

121

McKoy, 494 U.S. at 444.
m ld. at 442-43.
121
513 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1987).
121
I d . at 661. The instruction said that *[t]he mitigating circumstances which you may
consider, if established by the evidence, are these ...." ld. at 661 n.4. The list that followed
only included the statutorily prescribed mitigating circumstances.
tJO ld. at 663.
111
I d. at 662.
132
ld. at 662-63.
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court perceived as unimportant might have affected the value
judgment, based upon a sense of fairness or mercy rather than
merely logical reasoning, of typical jurors. Each juror was entitled
to value and weigh the mitigating factors presented in any fashion
that the juror might choose.133 Thus, the Florida court ignored
the variability that is built into the penalty phase decision process
in its analysis of the effect of the instruction. tM
The effect of the variability in the penalty phase decision on the
use of the harmless error doctrine cannot be underestimated. A
harmless error analysis of evidentiary error, like instructional
error, is affected by its variability. Unlike the assessment whether
a piece of evidence has affected a decision that an element of a
crime exists, where one can be more confident of the likely use of
the evidence, the use of evidence in the penalty phase is unpredictable. The following example of evidence erroneously introduced in
both the guilt and penalty phases of a trial illustrates this point.
Suppose that impermissible character evidence has been
admitted in the guilt phase of a trial for first degree murder in a
beating death. A witness testified that, one month before the crime
in question, the defendant beat another victim unceasingly with a
lead pipe until others intervened. The evidence is inadmissible for
the purpose of drawing a character inference. 136 If the evidence
is erroneously admitted, we can assume that, if the jurors considered the testimony credible, they would use the evidence for any
relevant purpose. The relevant purpose here would be to infer that,
if the defendant brutally beat someone with a lead pipe, he is a
violent person; if he is a violent person, it is more likely that he

133
The same reasoning underlies the United States Supreme Court's reversal in McKoy
v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990). See supra text accompanying notes 125-127 (noting
concern about failure to recognize that individual jurors may consider and weigh mitigating
factors in varying ways during the penalty phase).
J.U The Supreme Court has held that a state appellate court can constitutionally conduct
its own "reweighing" of the mitigating and aggravating factors. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494
U.S. 738, 750 (1990). However, a court like the Florida court in Delap is not conducting an
appellate reweighing. The court instead is finding no reversible error in the proceedings of
the lower court. The review of proceedings in the lower court mandates that the appellate
court must consider what jurors would do with the evidence.
116
For example, FED. R. EVID. 404(a) would prohibit an inference from the prior beating
that the defendant was violent and therefore acted in conformity with that character trait
on the occasion of the crime charged.
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killed or intended to kill the victim in this case. 136 Although the
individual jurors will assess the strength of the evidence in drawing
inferences from it, the use of the evidence is predictable based upon
the jury's job of deciding whether the elements of the crime exist.
In contrast, suppose that the same impermissible character
evidence is admitted in the penalty phase of a trial. How will the
jurors use the evidence of violence? In establishing an aggravating
circumstance, or refuting a mitigating circumstance, the jurors will
use the testimony of the prior beating in essentially the same way
as in the guilt phase. The evidence is predictably relevant to the
existence of certain facts. 137 However, the predictability fades
when the jurors are asked to weigh the aggravating and mitigating
factors. One juror might view the prior beating in coJ:\junction with
the present murder charge as an overwhelming indication that
aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances.
Another juror might view the prior beating as too far in the past to
have any bearing on the decision. Yet another juror might view the
prior beating as further evidence that the defendant suffered a
deprived youth. Thus, the impact of the testimony of the prior
beating on the more amorphous value judgment of whether the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances
is much less certain than the impact of similar evidence in a guilt
determination.
Moreover, the concern that the harmless error doctrine results in
the appellate court usurping the jurors' role 138 is exacerbated in
the penalty phase. When applying the harmless error doctrine to
a typical criminal trial, or to the guilt phase of a capital case, the
appellate court is assessing how typical or reasonable jurors used

1
•

The jurors might also use the prior beating as evidence that the defendant is violent
and deserve• to be puniehed for the prior beating. Thie would not be a permiuible use of
the evidence and there would probably be a limiting instruction to that effect. Once again,
however, this is a predictable use of the evidence in the guilt phase of the trial.
m Although the use is basically predictable in terms of relevancy, it still may remain
difficult to gauge whether such evidence •contributed• to the verdict in either the penalty
phase or the guilt phase of the trial.
1311
8« eupro notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
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the evidence at trial in finding particular facts.139 In order to find
the error harmless, the appellate court must conclude that, given
all the evidence presented against the defendant, the erroneously
admitted evidence did not contribute to the verdict. The appellate
court accomplishes this task by assessing the reaction of reasonable
jurors to the evidence. For example, suppose that evidence of drugs
found in the kitchen of the defendant's girlfriend was erroneously
admitted at defendant's trial for possession with intent to distribute
a controlled substance. Also suppose there is evidence that
defendant himself had drugs at his house, in his car, and on his
person; that he possessed weighing and packaging paraphernalia;
and that there was a tape recording of a transaction where
defendant accepted money for drugs. An appellate court might
conclude that no reasonable jury would have considered the drugs
in the girlfriend's kitchen, even though marginally relevant, in
finding the facts to be true that defendant possessed drugs and that
defendant had an intent to distribute. The appellate court is not
redeciding the case; it is judging the probability that evidence was
used for a particular purpose. 140

1
• The Court has emphasized that the appellate court is not to look at the impact of the
constitutional error in a vacuum, but rather to look at ita impact in the context of the actual
case tried. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081 (1993). In SuUivan, the Court held
that *the question [Chapman] instructs the reviewing court to consider is not what effect the
constitutional error might generally be expected to have upon a reasonable jury, but rather
what effect it had upon the guilty verdict in the case at hand. • /d. (diac:ussing Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)). By rejecting the approach oflooking at the effect of the error
on a "reasonable j ury; the Court was speaking of the effect of the error alone. In aaae88ing
the effect of the constitutional error in ~e case at hand; the Court had to neceaaarily
888ume that the jurors in the case at hand were reasonable or typical jurors. We do not
document how individual jurors reasoned in a particular case. Consequently, appellate
review is po88ible only by a88uming how a reasonable juror would have responded to the
evidence. The Court has recognized that it must a88ume the jurors in the case at hand were
reasonable. See, e.g., Chapman, 386 U.S. at 26 (noting the reaction of~onest, fair-minded
jurors•). Similarly, in Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1965), the Court referred to
the effect of the unconstitutionally admitted evidence •on the minds of an average jury.• /d.
at 254. Consequently, while this Article 888umes that appellate review would focus on the
reactions of jurors to the evidence in the case and not just the constitutional error in a
vacuum, it also assumes that the appellate court must presume reasonable or typical
reactions by those jurors.
140
The concern that a harmle88 error analysis usurps the jury's role is, in part, due to the
nature of the inquiry. If the court is focusing on the correctneaa of the actual verdict in the
case, the court is more likely to be in the position of appellate factfinder. See Goldberg,
supra note 7, at 429; see also Stacy & Dayton, supra note 5, at 126-38 (criticizing approach
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In the penalty phase, however, the appellate court would have to
be able to conclude that erroneously admitted evidence did not
enter into the individual value judgments of typical, reasonable
jurors. The decision involves more intuition into judgment calls
than assessing the probability of how evidence was used to find
facts. 141 Assume, for example, that evidence of defendant's prior
involvement with drugs was erroneously admitted in the penalty
phase. The appellate court is in the position of assessing, not the
probability that the evidence was pertinent to a fact, but instead
how jurors would react to the evidence. The appellate court's task
is particularly complicated because the jurors are almost unguided
in how they may use the evidence. The jurors may disregard it,
count it as a major factor, or consider it a minor mitigator.142
The appellate court cannot assume that there is a uniform response
to the evidence, unlike in the guilt phase where the use of the
evidence is more defined. Because it is difficult to analyze the error
from the usual angle of the typical jury, the appellate court is more
likely to be in fact reweighing the factors as they view them, which
usurps the trial jury's function. 143
The conceptual basis for routinely using the harmless error
doctrine in the penalty phase thus rests on a crumbling foundation.
The foundational block for the harmless error doctrine, that it is
possible to determine the effect of the error on the verdict, is
eroded. Applying the harmless error doctrine in a situation where
the rationale does not fit will lead to unsupported results. The
harmless error doctrine is only beneficial if there is confidence in

of assessing actual jury's likely verdict and approach of assessing hypothetical jury's likely
verdict, and suggesting a standard of whether the error would affect "a reasonable jury
drawing all inferences in a defendant's favor" rather than a focus on the likely outcome).
w See Scoville, supra note 111, at 755 (noting that appellate court is put in the position
of guessing what a " 'merciful' juror" would have done instead of the usual " 'reasonable'
juror").
142
See supra notes 103-105 and accompanying text (discussing use of mitigating factors
by individual jurors).
ua The appellate court can constitutionally reweigh the aggravating and mitigating
factors. See, e.g., Clemons v. Missisaippi, 494 U.S. 738, 748-50 (1990). This is not true of the
appellate review of a typical trial where such factfinding is not permisaible. However, to the
extent that the court is applying the harmless error doctrine in the review of the penalty
phase, and not engaging in appellate reweighing, the appellate court should not be usurping
the factfinder's function.
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the reliability of the verdict. 144 That confidence will be lacking in
penalty phase verdicts if the harmless error doctrine is routinely
applied. In particular, the primary reasoning underlying the
classification of errors as "structural"-that the systemic effect of
the error makes it difficult to assess the impact of the error-leads
to the conclusion that no error in the penalty phase should be
subjected to a harmless error analysis.146
Although the rationale for utilizing a harmless error analysis
would reject its application to penalty phase errors, the Supreme
Court has already approved the use of a harmless error analysis in
the penalty phase in two cases.148 The Court appears wedded to
basing the applicability of the harmless error analysis on the
labeling of an error as "structural" or "trial." Consequently, it is
unlikely that an argument, as advanced above, that the reasoning
behind the doctrine logically leads to a conclusion that the effect of
even a trial error in the penalty phase cannot be satisfactorily
assessed, will prevail. However, even assuming that the use of the
harmless error doctrine in the penalty phase is defensible, courts
tend to apply the doctrine in a perfunctory fashion. At a minimum,
courts should begin to acknowledge the different nature of the
decision in the penalty phase in an assessment of harmless error.
Arguments based on the difficulty of assessing the effect of error in
the penalty phase should be recognized. The labels of "structural"
and "trial" error must not be rigidly applied to the exclusion of the
reasoning behind the Chapman doctrine. The final subsection
addresses how courts should approach an assessment of harmless
error in the penalty phase consistent with Chapman.

144

The reliability of a verdict of death is a consistent theme in the Supreme Court cases.
See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (noting that because there
is a "qualitative difference• between death and a tenn of imprisonment, ~ere is a
corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the detennination that death is the
appropriate punishment in a specific case•); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)
(recognizing need for "a greater degree of reliabilit~ when the death sentence is imposed);
Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1988) ("Evolving standards of societal decency have
imposed a correspondingly high requirement of reliability on the detennination that death
is the appropriate penalty in a particular case.•); ,_ aZ.O WHITE, •upra note 103, at 8
(discussing Supreme Court decisions establishing special guidelines to be Wled for the
purpose of enhancing "reliability in capital sentencing-).
146
Scoville, •upra note 111, at 755-56.
146
See •upra text accompanying notes 38-49 (discuBBing Satterwhite and ClemoM ).
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C. APPLICATION OF HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS IN THE PENALTY
PHASE

Despite the logical difficulty in assessing whether an error has
contributed to the value-based decision in the penalty phase of
capital cases as discussed in the preceding subsection, this
subsection assumes that courts will continue to apply the harmless
error doctrine to penalty phase errors. State courts now routinely
apply a harmless error analysis to penalty phase error. 147 There
is a danger being realized in state court decisions that the unique
nature of the value judgment being made in the penalty phase will
not be factored into the assessment of the harm of a constitutional
error. It is crucial to educate the courts to the importance of
recognizing that a value judgment, and not a factfinding mission,
is occurring in the penalty phase. This subsection proposes a more
exacting analysis of harmless error in the penalty phase based
upon adherence to the underlying rationale of the doctrine and
acknowledgement of the value-based nature of the decision.
If the courts ignore the nature of the decision in the penalty
phase, error will be viewed as harmless without a fair assessment
of the impact of the error. The California Supreme Court, for
example, has treated the penalty decision as though it were a guilt
phase decision.148 Harmless error is assessed by considering
whether the aggravating evidence would have outweighed mitigating evidence even without the offending error. 149 For instance, in
People v. Robertson,150 the court found that, if the trial court
unconstitutionally failed to consider evidence of a lack of future
1
"
See, e.g., People v. Hamilton, 756 P.2d 1348, 1360 (Cal. 1988) (holding that error in
instruction that could have limited consideration of mitigating factors was hannle88), cerl.
denied, 489 U.S. 1040 (1989); Sireci v. State, 587 So. 2d 450, 454·55 (Fla. 1991) (holding error
of admitting testimony that defendant was •proud• of murder was hannle88), cerl. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1500 (1992); State v. Bey, 610 A.2d 814, 827-41 (N.J. 1992) (holding that errors,
inter alia, of excluding defense psychologist's report and admitting murder scene photograph
were harmle88); State v. Cook, 605 N.E.2d 70, 83-84 (Ohio 1992) (holding that error of
considering prior criminal record and psychiatric report on defendant was hannless); State
v. DePew, 528 N.E.2d 542, 555 (Ohio 1988) (holding that error of admitting photograph of
defendant with a marijuana plant, which was emphasized by prosecutor in closing argument,
was hannle88), cerl. denied, 489 U.S. 1042 (1989).
148
People v. Robertson, 767 P.2d 1109, 1128-31 (Cal.), cerl. denied, 493 U.S. 879 (1980).
148
/d.
160

Id.
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dangerousness, such error was harmless in light of the aggravating
evidence. 161
In cases such as Robertson, the courts treat the harmless error
issue as though it were merely a matter of the amount of evidence
supporting or not supporting a particular conclusion. The courts
fail to acknowledge the nature of the decision the jury is making in
weighing the evidence. Thus, in Robertson, the court should have
considered whether, despite ample aggravating evidence, evidence
of the lack of future dangerousness would have contributed to the
moral judgment of the sentencer. Even in People v. Lucero,162
where the California Supreme Court found that the erroneous
exclusion of psychological evidence in mitigation was not harmless
because there was little aggravating evidence,163 the court failed
to recognize the nature of the decision. The Lucero court's emphasis was on the amount of mitigating and aggravating evidence
rather than taking into account how the weighing decision is
reached. 164
Courts should approach the issue of a harmless error analysis in
the penalty phase in stages. 166 The first issue is the applicability
of the harmless error doctrine to the type of error involved, as
151

Id. at 651. Despite statements by the trial judge to the contrary, the California
Supreme Court held that the judge had considered the evidence defendant presented of hia
good acijustment to prison. ld. The trial judge, for instance, stated: 'The Court does not
consider the fact that [the defendant] does not appear to pose a threat to society aa long as
he's confined to prison to be a factor either in aggravation or mitigation ... ." Id. The
California Supreme Court, covering all baaea, went on to address the hannleae error issue
in case the trial judge did not consider the mitigating evidence. Id. at 653. In the course of
its harmleae error diacuaeion, the California court reviewed the aggravating evidence at
length and then concluded that the "lack of future dangerousness could not have affected its
penalty determination." Id.
161
750 P.2d 1342 (Cal. 1988).
161
Id. at 1353-57.
154
Id. In Lucero, the prosecution called only one witneae in the penalty phase. ld. at
1353. They called an expert, who testified to the flaws in psychological opinions, to refute
the defendant's psychological evidence of impairment. Id. The defendant presented
mitigating evidence of lack of criminal history, problem childhood, "traumatic military
experience," and mental illneae. I d . at 1352.
·
155
The fact that there are two stages is simply a restatement of the law aa understood
from Chapman. The stages are first, whether the harmleae error doctrine is applicable and
second, if applicable, whether the error was harmleae. These are the same stages identified
from Chapman and its progeny for all criminal cases. 8ft LAFAVE 8t ISRAEL, supra note 53,
§ 27.6, at 1167. However, the analysis of the iaeues in each stage must be tailored to the
nature of the penalty phase decision.
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discussed in the previous subsection. Rather than assuming that
the harmless error doctrine will apply because the type of error is
one where the doctrine would apply in the guilt phase, courts
should independently assess the propriety of using harmless error
analysis in the penalty phase. Thus, a court should ask whether
the effect of the error is determinable in the context of the penalty
phase, remembering the value judgment being made by the jurors
in the penalty phase.
Second, if the court finds that the harmless error analysis is
applicable, the court next must decide if, beyond a reasonable
doubt, the error did not contribute to the penalty verdict. The
penalty verdict is the decision that the aggravating circumstances
outweighed the mitigating circumstances.1156 This analysis calls
for a clear differentiation of the nature of the decision in the
penalty phase from the nature of the decision in the guilt phase.
Courts should be focused on the effect of the error on the subjective
value-based decision of the jurors in balancing aggravating and
mitigating factors in contrast to the more objective, factual decision
in the guilt phase.
As an example of the process courts should follow, consider the
following penalty phase scenario. Suppose that the trial court
refused to permit the defendant's mother to testify in the penalty
phase. She would have testified to physical abuse of defendant as
a child. However, the court did permit a psychologist to testify for
the defense. The psychologist testified to defendant's abused
childhood. based on her interviews with the defendant, his family,
and psychological testing, and also testified to the effects of that
abuse. Other mitigating evidence included defendant's alcohol
addiction and his remorse for the crime. Aggravating evidence
included the nature of the murder and the defendant's prior
convictions for robbery and manslaughter. The statutory aggravating circumstance proved was a murder in the course of a rob-

lN The court would also have a subsidiary issue of the harmlessness of the error to the
decision of the existence of an aggravating or mitigating factor. This analysis would be much
more parallel to the guilt phase analysis of harmless error. Regardless of the analysis of the
harmlessness of the error for this decision, however, the court would ultimately have to
assess the harmlessness of the error with regard to the balancing decision diacuaaed in the
text.

1993]

HARMLESS ERROR

161

bery. 157 The victim was killed in the course of a robbery that
resulted in holding hostages for twenty-four hours. The penalty
phase jury sentenced defendant to death in a "weighing" jurisdiction.158 On appeal, the court has found constitutional error in the
refusal to admit the mother's testimony.159 The remaining issue
is whether the error was harmless.
The question for the appellate court in the first stage is whether
the harmless error doctrine is applicable to the type of error found.
This question revisits the conceptual issue, addressed in the
previous subsection, that is largely ignored in the categorization of
errors as "structliral" or "trial."160 If one uses the structural-trial
dichotomy, the evidentiary error of excluding the mother's testimony would undoubtedly be labeled a trial error. Without regard to
the nature of the decision, the mother's testimony would simply be
viewed as comparable to the confession in Fulminante/ 61 or the
psychological testimony in Satterwhite. 162 As trial error, the
harmless error doctrine would be applicable.
A more conceptually honest approach would ask whether, given
the nature of the decisions in the penalty phase, it is possible, and
therefore practicable, to determine the effect of the error. Because
the "weighing" decision is so individual to each juror and reflects a
value judgment, it is difficult to assess the "contribution" of any
error. 163 A court should ask whether it is conceivable to assess
the effect of the exclusion of the mitigating testimony of the mother
on the critical decisions in the penalty phase. The applicability of

157
See supra note 94 (examining statutory aggravating factors, such as a murder in the
course of a robbery).
1118
See supra note 100 (showing typical weighing statutes).
1118
The defendant has a constitutional right to have the sentencer consider statutory and
nonstatutory mitigating evidence. See, e.g., Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 399 (holding
as error the lower court's refusal to consider nonstatutory mitigating evidence, including past
inhalation of car fumes, coming from a poor family, and being an Maffectionate uncle•).
180
See supra notes 119-145 and accompanying text (discussing the structural-trial error
dichotomy).
111
See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (discussing error analysis in Fulmin·

ante).
112

See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text (discussing Satterwhite).
See supra text accompanying notes 136-137 (discussing jury's inferences from
evidence). Even the contribution of the error to the preliminary decision by the jurors of
whether a mitigating circumstance exists poses problems because each juror may define
individually what a mitigating circumstance is and whether it exists.
188
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the harmless error doctrine should not be a foregone conclusion.
In this scenario, it would be quite difficult to assess the effect of
the mother's testimony. Some jurors might consider the mother's
testimony highly significant to the balance of aggravating and
mitigating factors, as the words of the mother might carry greater
weight than those of a dispassionate psychologist. Other jurors
might view the mother as biased, adding little to the psychologist's
summary. The mother's testimony is an example of the phenomenon, discussed in the previous subsection, of a typical trial error
that should be treated as a per se reversible, structural error in the
penalty phase on the basis of the rationale of the harmless error
doctrine. Because of the reliance on the structural-trial labels in
lieu of the rationale behind them, however, many courts would
quickly label the mother's testimony as trial error. The Supreme
Court similarly failed to recognize the different nature of the
penalty phase when it applied the harmless error doctrine to the
psychologist's testimony in Satterwhite. 164 Consequently, with
the Supreme Court's own failure to focus adequately on the
different nature of the penalty phase, it is clear that the primary
issue for litigation will not be whether the harmless error doctrine
is applicable to types of errors, but rather whether individual errors
are harmless.
The second stage of analysis is the application of the harmless
error standard to the error in the case. The jurors are to decide if
aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances.
Applying the Chapman standard, courts should ask whether there
is a reasonable possibility that the excluded evidence would have
contributed to that decision.
It is complicated to assess the harm resulting from an error
affecting the weighing decision.166 The appellate- court is now in
1
"
186

See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text (discu88ing Satterwhite).
There is also a preliminary decision made by the sentencer whether aggravating and
mitigating circumatances exist. The decision whether a mitigating circumstance exists,
although similar on the surface to the guilt phase decision, involves more variability.
Neverthele88, an appellate court could pose the question, comparable to a guilt phase error,
whether there is a likelihood that the excluded testimony of the mother would have
contributed to a decision that a mitigating factor of an abua.ed childhood existed. Here, the
court would have to consider the nature of the evidence, the strength in the mother's
knowledge, and the wealtne1111 in the obvious bias of the mother. The court would also have
to consider the other evidence on point-the psychologist's testimony about the abused
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the position of guessing how reasonable jurors would make a value
judgment, instead of a fact-based decision. The court must assume
a reasonable judgmental juror. 166 In fact-based decisions, the
court is able to assume a logical progression in reasoning from fact
to conclusion. But the weighing decision calls for an assumption of
the personal feelings of "reasonable" jurors towards the evidence. 167 The Supreme Court has referred to the penalty phase
decision as a " 'reasoned moral response.' "168
In the hypothetical scenario concerning the mother's testimony
about the defendant's abused background, the appellate court must
ask: Is there a reasonable possibility that the lack of the mother's
testimony contributed to the jurors' reasoned moral or judgmental
balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances? This
question is significantly more multifaceted than assessing the
contribution of evidence to whether a mitigating circumstance or an
element of a crime exists. The court must take into account the
emotions, as well as the logical reasoning, of the "reasonable" juror.
Thus, in our scenario, the court must assess the likely reaction
of jurors to the defendant's own mother acknowledging physical

background. Would reasonable juron have recognized the mitigating circumstance of an
abused background with just the psychologist's testimony such that the mother's testimony
would not have mattered? Would reasonable juron have rejected the mitigating circumstance on the basis of just the psychologist's testimony and would the mother's testimony,
therefore, have contributed to a different decision? It is a more difficult asseument than
that made in a typical guilt phase because each juror may, in essence, decide what
constitutes a mitigating circumstance as well as whether the evidence supports a finding of
that mitigating circumstance.
111
See Scoville, •upra note 111, at 755 (referring to •merciful• juron as the standard, but
contrasting the merciful juron with •reasonable" juron). The author is correct that the
juron are permitted to include •mercy" in their decision because they are being asked a
virtually unguided value judgment. On the other hand, an appellate court must assume an
average, typical, or reasonable •merciful" juror in reviewing how the evidence or instructions
were likely to be used. Otherwise, the appellate court is in a position of either aecond
guening particular juron in a case or speculating on an infinite variety of reactions. This
Article agrees that the appellate court must assume an average, typical, or reasonable juror,
but it must aseume an average, typical, or reasonable juror who is making a value-based
decision.
1
.., The Supreme Court has held that it is constitutional to instruct juron not to respond
with •mere sympathy: but only because any sympathy juron feel must be a reaction to the
evidence presented. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542 (1987).
118
Same v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484,493 (1990) (quoting Brown, 479 U.S. at 545 (O'Connor,
J., concurring)). The Court, thus, recognized the combination of a value-based judgment call
and logic by referring to the juron' task as a " 'reasoned moral response.' " Id.
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abuse of her son as well as the jurors, likely reaction to the murder
itself and the hostage aspect of the crime. If the court properly
focuses on whether it can find that the erroneous exclusion of the
mothers testimony did not contribute to the death verdict, 169 it
seems unlikely that the court could conclude that the error was
harmless. Although there is similar testimony from the psychologist, the nature of the evidence would probably affect reasonable
jurors. The testimony of defendant's own mother is strong
emotional evidence. Her mere presence on the witness stand may
well affect jurors, views of the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors.
Even if the court focuses on whether there is overwhelming
evidence to support the death verdict, 170 it seems likely that the
error is still not harmless. Although the defendanfs prior crimes
and hostage-taking present substantial aggravating evidence, the
issue is whether there is overwhelming evidence that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors. To gauge whether the
evidence is overwhelming in the penalty phase context, the court
would have to conclude that the jurors would not be likely to place
significant value on the mothers testimony in conjunction with the
other mitigating evidence. Because jurors are free to value
mitigating evidence as they choose,171 a court would be hardpressed to conclude that reasonable jurors would not place
substantial value on a mothers testimony about her son,s background. Consequently, if the jurors had heard the mothers
testimony, a court could not confidently find that the evidence was
overwhelming that the aggravating factors outweighed the
mitigating factors.
The nature of the penalty phase decision-the weighing of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances-is thus critical in the
analysis of harmless error. The harmlessness of the error is based
on assessing how much the various pieces of evidence affect the

1
• See 1upra notes 51-63 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's waming on its
interpretation of the term •contributes•).
110
See 1upra text accompanying note 63 (discussing Court's approach of looking at
whether there is •overwhelming- evidence to support the verdict, which usually results in
finding the error harmless).
171
See supra text accompany:ng notes 103-105 (discussing jurors' assessment of
mitigating evidence).
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jurors' intuitive feelings about the balance of aggravating and
mitigating evidence. Although there is a logical component to the
analysis, other intuitive or judgmental components also must be
considered. 172
The distinct nature of the penalty phase decision necessitates a
clearer delineation of the analysis of harmless error. It is important to understand the reasoning of courts from both a theoretical
and a practical view. From a theoretical viewpoint, a clear
analytical outline will foster a coherent, principled approach to the
harmless error doctrine, which currently is lacking. Courts should,
in the first stage, explain why certain errors are subject to
harmless error analysis; mere labels of "structural" and "trial"
errors are insufficient. Courts should also, in the second stage,
clarify their use of the "contributes" standard. From a practical
viewpoint, lawyers will be able to understand the merits of the
issues and form their arguments with more cohesion based upon an
understanding of the principles supporting a harmless error
doctrine.
IV. CONCLUSION

The harmless error doctrine conserves judicial time. Judgments
that did not affect the verdict are not reversed for error. The
preservation of judgments, despite harmless error, promotes the
integrity of our criminal justice system. But there is no integrity
in a haphazard use of the harmless error doctrine. The doctrine
should not be used solely as a vehicle to speed resolution of cases.
The harmless error doctrine has a place in our legal system, but
only within the boundaries of its legal rationale. If cut loose from
its rationale, harmless error demeans the constitutional interests
at stake.
The harmless error doctrine is only appropriate if the error's
effect on the verdict is calculable. The value-based nature of the
112

For an explanation on a theoretical level of why both a logical and an emotional
judgment is made by the jurors in the penalty phase, see Scott W. Howe, Resolving the
Conflict in the Capital Sentencing Cases: A Desert-Oriented Theory ofRegulation, 26 GA. L.
REv. 323 (1992) (explaining that penalty phase decision involves aBSessment of both the
culpability and the just deserts of defendant, providing critique of Supreme Court cases, and
offering insight into why the Court has trouble finding a principled approach in this area).
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decision in the penalty phase of a capital case, weighing aggravating and mitigating factors, renders it difficult, at best, to calculate
the effect of an error. A recognition that the value-based nature of
the decision in the penalty phase is distinct from the factfinding
nature of the guilt or innocence decision in a typical trial is the
first step. An important second step will be court decisions on
penalty phase error that reflect a better understanding of the
purpose and rationale of the harmless error doctrine. The penalty
phase verdict requires a harmless error analysis tailored to an
understanding of the effect ofconstitutional error when the decision
reflects a value judgment.

